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Paper presented to the 34th Annual Study Conference of BIALL in Cardiff, June 2003 
by James S. Heller, Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law, The College of 
William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia USA. 
Introduction 
The closest thing we in the United States have to what the 
British and Canadians call devolution is federalism: the 
sharing of power between the states and the federal 
government. 
A U.S. Supreme Court decision in 200 I, Lorillard 
Tobacco v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525, sheds some light on the 
tensions between the power of the federal government 
and the states. The events that led up to the Court's decision 
actually began several years ago when the state of 
Massachusetts enacted a regulation limiting the advertising 
of tobacco products within 1,000 feet of playgrounds, 
parks and schools. One might think that a state would have 
the authority to pass such a law, but that is not what the 
Supreme Court decided. 
A federal law already on the books - the Cigarette 
Labelling and Advertising Act - prescribed health warnings 
that must appear on packaging and advertisements for 
cigarettes. The tobacco companies challenged the state law 
(Reilly was the Attorney General of Massachusetts), and the 
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the federal act pre-
empted the state from imposing any requirement or 
prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to the 
advertising or promotion of cigarettes. 
In Lorillard, the Court focused on the Supremacy 
Clause - Article VI, clause 2 - of the U.S. Constitution, which 
commands that the laws of the United States are the 
supreme law of the land. But when we look at federal- state 
issues, we usually think first of the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution: "Powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
Although the Tenth Amendment is probably the clearest 
example of federalist principles in the Constitution, it does 
not always constrain on federal power. Its authority is tem-
pered by other constitutional principles, including the Com-
merce Clause (Art.l, Sec.8, cI.3), the Necessary and Proper 
Clause (Art.l, Sec.18, cI.18), and as we saw in the Lorillard 
case, the Supremacy Clause. 
During the Twentieth Century the Commerce Clause 
became the most important source of federal power. 
The federal government has power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations and among the various states, including 
the channels of commerce (such as roads and railroad 
tracks) the instrumentalities of commerce (such as trucks 
and trains), and also activities that have a substantial effect 
on commerce. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
authorises Congress to make all laws that are necessary and 
proper for executing Congress's constitutional powers, and 
also those of the executive branch, which includes the 
federal administrative agencies. 
In this brief article I will take a quick (and concededly, 
cursory) tour of 200 years of the evolution of federal-state 
relationships in the United States, especially U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the Constitution. 
Evolution of federal-state 
relationships in the US 
Early days and the US Constitution 
The story begins in 1788. James Madison, writing in Federalist 
Paper Number 45, explains that a strong federal government 
is needed to address the historical failures of confederacies, 
due to lack of any real central authority. One year later the 
U.S. Constitution was ratified. The case of Chisholm v. 
Georgia 2 U.S. 419 was heard in 1793. Here the Supreme 
Court, over the complaint of the state of Georgia, held that 
the federal courts had jurisdiction over suits by a citizen of 
one state against another state. But Chisholm did not last 
long. In 1798 the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, thereby 
preventing suits against a state by citizens of other states or 
by foreigners. 
The same year also saw the end of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts. President John Adams was using these two federal acts 
to stifle political opposition. The Sedition Act proscribed 
spoken or written criticism of the government, Congress. 
or the President. The Alien Enemies Act gave the President 
the power to imprison or deport aliens suspected of posing 
a threat to the national government. The Virginia and 
Kentucky legislatures considered these acts unconstitutional 
and passed resolutions nullifying them. Rather than fight, 
Congress thought it politically expedient to let the Acts 
expire. 
Nineteenth century decisions and 
the appointment of John Marshall 
In 180 I, Adams appointed John Marshall Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In 1803, the "Great Chief Justice," as 
Marshall is known, wrote the decision in Marbury v. 
Madison (5 U.S. 137). The facts of Marbury are not of 
great consequence: the case centred on the refusal of a new 
president, Thomas Jefferson, to finalise the appointment of 
a federal justice of the peace to the bench. Adams, a 
Federalist, had made several appointments late in his term, 
including one for William Marbury. Jefferson assumed the 
Presidency before the appointment was finalised, and 
ordered James Madison, his Secretary of State, not to 
deliver the appointment. Marbury sued. What is important 
in this case is not the result (Marbury lost), but rather the 
Court's decree that it had the power to declare laws 
unconstitutional: the power of judicial review rests 
ultimately in the hands of the Supreme Court. 
We move ahead to 1816 and the case Martin v 
Hunter's Lessee 14 U.S. 304. Here the Court still led by 
Marshall extended judicial review over state court 
judgments, and any state action that involved a question of 
federal law. 
Three years later, in 1819, the decision in McCulloch v 
Maryland 17 U.S. 316 further expanded federal power 
under the authority of the Constitution's Necessary and 
Proper Clause. The state of Maryland tried to tax the 
operations of the Second Bank of the United States, which 
was created in 1816 to address the fiscal crises resulting 
from the War of 1812. McCuliouch, a cashier at the federal 
bank, refused to pay the tax, and the state of Maryland sued. 
The Court reasoned that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause meant that the federal government could take 
whatever actions appropriate to implement its prescribed 
powers. Marshall wrote that when the Constitution is silent 
as to powers reserved to the states, the Court could assume 
that the federal government may exercise its authority. In 
affirming the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the 
United States, the Court endorsed a strong interpretation 
of federal power. 
In 1824 Gibbons v Ogden 22 U.S. I was heard. The 
state of New York believed that it had exclusive authority to 
grant licences to individuals to navigate steamboats from 
New York to New Jersey, and granted Aaron Ogden a 
licence as part of the monopoly. However, Thomas Gibbons 
received a similar licence from Congress to operate a ferry 
service along the same route. The Supreme Court, still 
under the leadership of Marshall, held that the New York 
monopoly directly conflicted with Congress's power to 
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regulate interstate commerce, and was therefore uncon-
stitutional. Gibbons marked the beginning of the ascendancy 
of the Commerce Clause by extending it to intercourse 
between states. 
We see a resurgence of state power after Marshall died 
in 1835, when only one year later, President Andrew 
Jackson and Congress let the charter of the Second Bank of 
the United States expire. A populist, Jackson supported a 
concept called dual-federalism - mutually exclusive spheres 
of state and federal power. Jackson believed that exempting 
the operations of the federal bank from state taxation 
violated the Tenth Amendment, which reserves non-
delegated power to the state. 
Move forward forty years to 1873 and the 
Slaughterhouse Cases (83 U.S. 36) . The Louisiana 
legislature passed a law granting a corporation the exclusive 
right to operate slaughterhouses in three parishes for 
twenty-five years. Butchers in New Orleans argued that the 
state violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights, including 
the Privilege and Immunities and Due Process clauses. In 
holding that Louisiana could regulate slaughterhouses, the 
Court wrote that the right of butchers to engage in business 
was not a "privilege and immunity" protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, nor property protected by the 
Due Process clause. The Court drew a distinction between 
federal and state citizenship: the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not prevent the state from exercising jurisdiction over 
the rights of its citizens, and the privileges of state citizenship 
remained under the sole protection of state government. 
Early twentieth century and 
reassertion of federal authority 
Soon after the turn of the Century, the Supreme Court 
decided Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45. In 1905 the 
Court used the due process clause, under a theory of 
fundamental economic rights, to overturn a New York law 
that limited the number of hours in a baker's working week. 
Although in fact this was a victory for the business sector 
over government regulation - in this case regulation by the 
state - it was a strong assertion of federal authority through 
the Supreme Court's decision-making power. Lochner 
began what is called the substantive due process era, during 
which the Court struck down various state laws which it 
thought interfered with employers' rights to contract with 
their employees. 
The Great Depression and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 
We jump over the First World War and the Roaring 
Twenties to the Great DepreSSion and the Roosevelt era. 
FDR believed that a centralised response was needed to 
remedy the depression. The Supreme Court believed other-
wise. During Roosevelt's first term, the Court rejected 
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several New Deal programs. One such example is the 1935 
case, Schecther Poultry Corp. v. United States 295 
U.S. 495 where the Court declared the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933 unconstitutional. 
Roosevelt's solution was a court packing plan: appoint 
new Supreme Court justices whenever a sitting member of 
the Court turned seventy years of age and did not retire. 
Roosevelt announced his plan in a March 7, 1937 Fireside 
Chat. Twenty days later, the Court handed down its decision 
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379. The 
Court overturned Lochner, and upheld a Washington state 
statute establishing a minimum wage for women. Some 
people refer to this decision as the "switch in time that saves 
nine," the story being that by changing his vote to support 
the legislation, Justice Roberts made FOR's Court Packing 
legislation unnecessary. 
That same year the Court further expanded Congress's 
power to regulate commerce in National Labor 
Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp 
30 I U.S. 57. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Company had fired 
ten workers who were union leaders, and then ignored 
an order by the National Labor Relations Board to rehire 
the workers. Noting that work stoppages would impact 
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court upheld the 
authority of the NLRB under the Commerce Clause. 
Congress, the Court wrote, has authority to enact all 
appropriate legislation to protect or advance interstate 
commerce. 
Judicial endorsement of broad federal authority 
continued into the war years. In 1941 the Court upheld a 
federal minimum wage law in United States v. Darby 312 
U.S. 100. The Court marginalized the Tenth Amendment, 
writing that it merely described the obvious; there was no 
set limit upon the enumerated powers of Congress. In 
overruling a case it decided twenty-two years earlier 
Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 25 I that held that 
Congress could not exclude the products of child labour 
from interstate commerce, in Darby the court held that 
prohibiting the shipment interstate of goods produced 
under sub-standard labour conditions was indeed within 
Congress's authority. 
The Lyndon B. Johnson Civil 
Rights era 
We will skip over the Eisenhower years and jump to the 
Johnson Civil Rights era. In Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. 
United States 379 U.S. 241, the Court upheld the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and, in particular, provisions that 
prohibited racial discrimination in public places, including 
public accommodation. Noting that 75% of the hotel 's 
business came from out-of-state guests, the Court 
concluded that its business clearly affected interstate 
commerce. Federal legislation, the Court wrote, would be 
upheld under the Commerce Clause if there was any 
"rational basis" that explained Congressional action. 
But the liberal 1960's gave way to a more conservative 
America, and a more conservative Court. The end of the 
Twentieth Century saw a startling break with fifty years of 
jurisprudence, especially after Clarence Thomas replaced 
Thurgood Marshall on the Court in 1991. Soon 
afterwards, in 1992 the Court ruled in New York v. 
United States 505 U.S. 144 that the federal government 
may not compel or coerce the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program, here the storage 
of radioactive waste. 
Resurgence of a more conservative 
court with the appointment of 
Clarence Thomas 
In 1995 United States v Lopez 514 U.S. 549 was heard. 
Here, a high school student who carried a concealed 
handgun into his school was charged with violating the 
federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbade 
possessing firearms in a school zone. The Court rejected 
the government's argument that possessing guns near 
schools was a "commercial activity" that could be regulated 
under the Commerce Clause. Lopez was the first case since 
1936 in which the Court ruled that Congress had exceeded 
its power under the Commerce Clause. 
Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898 was another gun 
case, decided by the Court in 1997. The federal Brady Act 
authorised the Attorney General of the United States to 
establish a national system for checking criminal records of 
potential gun purchasers. During an interim period, hoW-
ever, state officers were to conduct the background checks. 
In an example of the "unfunded mandates" justification used 
occaSionally to overturn federal legislation, the Court held 
that the federal government may not compel state officers 
either to administer or to enforce a federal regulatory 
scheme, espeCially without compensation. 
If you read Printz you will see the heated debates 
among the justices about what they believe to be the 
appropriate balance between federal and state power. 
Justice Scalia resurrected jackson's dual sovereignty 
approach to federal-state issues. The dissenters - Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer - believed that the 
federal legislation was a legitimate exercise of federal power 
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. 
At the turn of the millennium, Congress used both the 
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments to strike down 
federal laws. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 528 
U.S. 62 the Court found that although Congress intended to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it 
passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA), and make states liable for violating the ADEA. such 
abrogation exceeded Congress' authority under section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. One year after Kimel, the 
Court ruled in University of Alabama v. Garrett 531 
U.S. 356 that the Eleventh Amendment bars employees 
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from receiving monetary damages from state employers 
who violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
Arguably the most controversial of all of these decisions 
was Bush v. Gore 521 U.S. 98, the December 2000 case 
where the U.S. Supreme Court stayed a decision of the 
Florida Supreme Court ordering a recount of presidential 
ballots , thereby halting the recount and handing 
the presidency to George Bush. The Court essentially told 
the Florida Supreme Court that it (Florida) could not have 
the final say on how it conducts its elections. 
Conclusions 
In 1985, Justice O'Conner wrote in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan_Transit Authority 469 U.S. 
528 ofthe "battle scene offederalism." In fact, the Court's 
decisions seem to reveal not so much a battle over 
the relationship between the states and the federal 
government, but instead pure politics. Although the tenor 
of the Court swings (usually slowly) with changes in societal 
norms, and with the men and women who sit in the nine 
chairs, in the last dozen years the Court's decisions seem 
more transparent than ever before. When the Court 
disapproves of the state law, as in the Lorillard tobacco 
case, it hoists the Supremacy Clause flag. When it does not 
approve of the federal law, as in the Lopez gun free school 
zones case, it decrees that Congress exceeded its authority 
under the Commerce Clause, or as in Kimel and Garrett, 
points to the Eleventh Amendment. 
The result-oriented decisions of the Supreme Court 
since the early 1990's make it difficult to predict how the 
Court will rule on contests between federal and state 
authority. Battles have been waged for more than two 
hundred years, and there is no end in sight. Federal-state 
relationships in the United States are forever changing and 
are, at least for the time being, unpredictable. 
BIALL Conference 2003 - Members enjoying themselves at the 
Sweet & Maxwell sponsored Annual Dinner and Presentation of 
Awards on a theme of Moulin Rouge 
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